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BOOK NOTE
SUBURBS UNDER SIEGE: RACE, SPACE AND AUDACIOUS JUDGES.
By Charles M. Haar. Princeton: Princeton University Press,
1996. pp. xiv, 256. $29.95.
Reviewed by Abigail T. Baker*
I. INTRODUCTION
Across the United States, cities are witnessing a mass exodus
into the suburbs with increasing frequency.' The prestige that
once attached to urbanites2 is now equated with these "new
suburbanites." Claiming better schools,' safer neighborhoods4
and overall peace of mind,5 the new suburbanites have been
* BA, 1992, Indiana University;, J.D., 1996, T.C. Williams School of Law, Uni-
versity of Richmond. The author would like to thank Professor Michael Allan Wolf for
his guidance in writing this paper. This paper is dedicated to the author's grandpar-
ents, Max and Polly Bechtold.
1. The 1990 Census reported that 46% of the total U.S. population lives in the
suburbs, while 31.3% lives in the cities. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, 1990 CENSUS OF
POPULATION AND HOUSING, SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC CHARACTERISTICS, METROPOLITAN
AREAS 88 (1990).
2. See KENNETH T. JACKSON, CRABGRASS FRONTIER (1985). Jackson states that
cities were populated by the wealthy who did not want to walk far from their home
to the office.
There was the tendency of the most fashionable and respectable address-
es to be located close to the center of town. In Europe, this affinity for
the city's core represented the continuation of a tradition that dated back
thousands of years. To be a resident of a big town was to enjoy the best
of life, to have a place in man's true home. To live outside the walls,
away from palaces and cathedrals, was to live in inferior surroundings.
Id. at 15.
3. Id. at 289-90.
4. See Jerry Adler, Paved Paradise, NEWSWEEK, May 15, 1995, at 42, 44.
5. See Jerry Adler, 15 Ways to Fix the Suburbs, NEWSWEEK, May 15, 1995, at
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the pied-piper to thousands of other city dwellers. By and large,
those that have been able to afford to move out of the cities are
white, middle-class Americans.6 Local exclusionary zoning, by
permitting only certain types of homes to be built in a specific
area, has rendered the American dream-owning a home in
suburbia-unattainable for many. As a result, the inner cities
remain shells of their former selves,7 and have become invisible
prisons for their lower-income, minority residents.
The "seeds" of exclusionary zoning can be seen in land-use
regulation of the early twentieth century.' In 1926, the Su-
preme Court "placed its imprimatur on [the validity of zon-
ing]" in Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co.' ° Euclid in-
volved a Fourteenth Amendment challenge to a zoning ordi-
nance that excluded "apartment houses, business houses, retail
stores and shops, and other like establishments."" At its con-
ception, Euclidean zoning was seen as the simple solution to
preventing the character of a neighborhood from being subjected
to the "whims of developers or the insistence of neighbors."' It
was more effective than covenants and defeasible fees, which
had the potential of disturbing the right of alienation."
While Euclidean zoning was facially aimed to exclude uses, 4
it effectively excluded persons. 5 Indeed, Euclidean zoning gar-
46 ("[Gletting up in Bucks County beats a full night's sleep in Brooklyn").
6. Cf David Hatcher, The Black Flight to the 'Burbs," THE CRISIS, Jan. 1995, at
30; Alex Marshall, The Quiet Integration of Suburbia: America's Fastest Growing Met-
ropolitan Areas Contain Some of the Nation's Most Racially Balanced Neighborhoods,
AMERICAN DEMOGRAPHICS, Aug. 1994, at 9.
7. Joel Garreau correlates the downfall of the cities with the growth of Edge
Cities, "hearths of our civilizations-in which the majority of metropolitan Americans
now work and around which we live ... " JOEL GARREAu, EDGE CITY: LIFE ON THE
NEW FRONTIER 3 (1991).
8. See Michael Allan Wolf, The Prescience and Centrality of Euclid v. Ambler, in
ZONING AND THE AMERICAN DREAM 252 (Charles M. Haar & Jerold S. Kayden eds.,
1989).
9. Michael Allan Wolf, Takings Term II: New Tools for Attacking and Defending
Environmental and Land-Use Regulation, 13 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 469, 472 (1993).
10. 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
11. Id. at 390.
12. Wolf, supra note 8, at 254.
13. See id.
14. "Exclusion is the essence of Euclidean zoning." Id.
15. See CHARLES M. HAAR & JEROLD S. KAYDEN, LANDMARK JUSTICE: THE INFLU-
ENCE OF WILLIAM J. BRENNAN ON AMERICA'S COMMUNITIES 149 (1989) ("By restricting
the use, shape and size of buildings placed on the land, traditional land-use controls
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nered much support due to the nascent xenophobia in the early
twentieth century. 6 Today, seventy years after Euclid, it
seems that only the faces have changed. Now, there is a fear of
anything beyond the walls of suburbia. 7 It was the desire to
preserve the content of suburbia-this fear of the differ-
ent-that motivated the zoning ordinance that has become the
subject of the seminal exclusionary-zoning case of the twentieth
century: Southern Burlington County NAACP v. Township of
Mount Laurel."
For New Jersey, and some other states,'9 the Mount Laurel
Doctrine"0 would forever alter the role of the courts in an area
that has been traditionally reserved for the legislature.2' What
has prompted the most criticism22 of the Mount Laurel Doc-
trine are the affirmative obligations and remedies the New
indirectly, but fundamentally, affect the personal lives of individuals.").
16. See Wolf, supra note 8, at 255.
17. For a particularly lucid article on today's walled suburbs, see David J. Kenne-
dy, Note, Residential Associations as State Actors: Regulating the Impact of Gated
Communities on Nonmembers, 105 YALE L.J. 761 (1995).
18. 336 A.2d 713 (N.J.) (Mount Laurel 1), appeal dismissed and cert. denied, 423
U.S. 808 (1975), modified and enforced, 391 A.2d 935 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div.
1978), rev'd in part and remanded, 456 A.2d 390 (N.J. 1983) (Mount Laurel 11). The
heroine of Mount Laurel is Ethel Lawrence, who, in 1974, with the help of her
daughter and niece, brought an action against Mount Laurel township. Lawrence's
committee, the Springville Action Committee, planned to build about 100 units of low-
income housing. The plan did not comport with Mount Laurel's then existing mini-
mum half-acre ordinance. When Mount Laurel refused to change the ordinance, Ms.
Lawrence brought a lawsuit seeking an injunction against the ordinance and de-
claratory relief.
19. See Jerome G. Rose, Waning Judicial Legitimacy, The Price of Judicial Pro-
mulgation of Urban Policy, 20 URB. LAW. 801, 818 (1988) (discussing Oregon's at-
tempt to codify Mount Laurel in its urban renewal plan); cf John M. Payne, From
the Courts, 20 REAL. EST. L.J. 75 (1991) (stating that New Jersey's Mount Laurel
decisions will not have an effect in most states because of its judicial remedies).
20. The Mount Laurel Doctrine consists of the judicial remedies linked to Mount
Laurel I, and its progeny Mount Laurel I1 and Hills Dev. Co. v. Township of
Bernards (Mount Laurel II1), 510 A.2d 621 (N.J. 1986).
21. See, e.g., N.J. CONST. art. IV, § 6, para. 2 (1947).
The Legislature may enact general laws under which municipalities, oth-
er than counties, may adopt zoning ordinances limiting and restricting to
specified districts and regulating therein, buildings and structures, accord-
ing to their construction, and the nature and extent of their use, and the
nature and extent of the uses of land, and the exercise of such authority
shall be deemed to be within the police power of the State. Such laws
shall be subject to repeal or alteration by the Legislature.
Id.
22. See infra part III.
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Jersey Supreme Court articulated in Mount Laurel H.23 The
court, fed up with municipalities' half-hearted attempts' to
comply with the obligation articulated in Mount Laurel I,'
came down harshly in Mount Laurel H.6 Some of the reme-
dies the court created were subsidies," incentive zoning,"
zoning for mobile homes," mandatory set-asides of low- and
moderate-income units, ° and least-cost housing."' The court,
according to most critics, had become a "super-zoning board."32
23. 456 A.2d at 390. Mount Laurel II was actually a consolidation of six cases:
Urban League v. Township of Mahwah, No. L-17112-71 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div.
Mar. 8, 1979) (unreported); Glenview Dev. Co. v. Franklin Township, 397 A.2d 384
(N.J. Super Ct. Law Div. 1978); Southern Burlington County NAACP v. Township of
Mt. Laurel, 391 A.2d 935 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1978); Caputo v. Township of
Chester, No. L-42857-74 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. Oct. 4, 1978) (unreported); Round
Valley, Inc. v. Township of Clinton, No. L-29710-74 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. Feb.
24, 1978) (unreported), rev'd, 413 A.2d 356 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1980); Urban
League v. Borough of Carteret, 359 A.2d 526 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1976), rev'd,
406 A.2d 1322 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1979).
24. Actually, some believe that the municipalities were not at fault, but that the
courts misplaced their belief in the causal relationship between the mandates of
inclusionary zoning and the "availability and unavailability of low cost housing." G.
Alan Tarr & Russell S. Harrison, Legitimacy and Capacity in State Supreme Court
Policymaking: The New Jersey Court and Exclusionary Zoning, 15 RUTGERS L.J. 513,
556 (1984).
25. 336 A.2d at 718.
[E]very ["developing municipality"] must, by its land use regulations, pre-
sumptively make realistically possible an appropriate variety and choice
of housing. More specifically, presumptively it cannot foreclose the oppor-
tunity of the classes of people mentioned for low and moderate income
housing and in its regulations must affirmatively afford that opportunity,
at least to the extent of the municipality's fair share of the present and
prospective need therefor. These obligations must be met unless the par-
ticular municipality can sustain the heavy burden of demonstrating pecu-
liar circumstances which dictate that it should not be required to do so.
Id.
26. 456 A.2d at 410-411.
After all this time, ten years after the trial court's initial order invalidat-
ing its zoning ordinance, Mount Laurel remains afflicted with a blatantly
exclusionary zoning ordinance. Papered over with studies, rationalized by
hired experts, the ordinance at its core is true to nothing but Mount
Laurel's determination to exclude the poor. Mount Laurel is not alone; we
believe that there is widespread non-compliance with the constitutional
mandate of our original opinion in this case.
Id.
27. See id. at 443-45.
28. See id. at 445-46.
29. See id. at 450-51.
30. See id. at 446-50.
31. See id. at 451-52.
32. John M. Payne, Rethinking Fair Share: The Judicial Enforcement of Af-
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These remedies would not be as troublesome if they came
from the legislature.33 Instead, it was the New Jersey Supreme
Court, without the explicit authority of the New Jersey Con-
stitution,' that issued the remedies. In order to execute these
remedies, the court called for the use of special masters who
were experts in the field of planning35 and put three trial
court judges in charge of administering the remedies, making
sure that they were completed." To insulate itself from judi-
cial review, the court altered the appellate rules of the supreme
court,37 and stretched the period of finality for a Mount Laurel
court decision to six years.38
Almost all observers agree that the court provided a solution
to the problem of exclusionary zoning."m While proponents of
fordable Housing Policies, 16 REAL EST. L.J. 20, 27 (1987); see also infra part IIIAL.
33. See Jose L. Fernandez, State Constitutions, Environmental Rights Provisions,
and the Doctrine of Self-Execution: A Political Question? 17 HARV. ENVTL. L. R V.
333, 360 (1993) ("[Tlhe resemblance of the court's ruling to a piece of detailed legisla-
tion accentuates the court's appropriation of legislative and executive powers in en-
forcing this constitutional provision."); see also infra part IV.A.1 (discussing the FHA's
role in the separation of powers context).
34. The New Jersey Constitution does not contain a due process clause or an
equal protection clause, both of which are necessary for the court's argument that
there is a right to affordable housing. Instead, the court said that a right to afford-
able housing exists in Article IV of the New Jersey Constitution which provides that:
"All persons are by nature free and independent, and have certain natural and un-
alienable rights, among which are those enjoying and defending life and liberty, of ac-
quiring, possessing and protecting property, and of pursuing and obtaining safety and
happiness." N.J. CONST. art. I, para. 1 (1947). This is a non-self-executing provision.
Fernandez, supra note 33, at 361. A non-self-executing provision "must provide the
court with a complete and enforceable rule." Id.
35. Mount Laurel II, 456 A.2d at 459. For a critical discussion on why masters
are no better than the uninformed judges, see Jerome G. Rose, New Additions to the
Lexicon of Exclusionary Zoning Litigation, 14 SETON HALL L. REv. 851, 870 (1984).
36. 456 A.2d at 458-59.
37. Id. at 458.
38. Id. at 459; see Rose, supra note 19, at 829-30; Tarr & Harrison, supra note
24, at 589.
39. See Rose, supra note 35, at 873-74. Rose argues that the court's role never
ends because it is still responsible for "determining the eligibility of low income buy-
er/renters, reviewing rents and other charges to low income renters and approv[ing]
purchasers and the initial and subsequent sale prices o housing units." Id. at 873. In
addition, the court still has to determine issues that aiise when there is a mortgage
foreclosure, a default in rent, or the death of the owner; see also Robert F.
Blomquist, Solar Energy Development, State Constitutional Interpretation and Mount
Laurel II: Second Order Consequences of Innovative Policymaking by the New Jersey
Supreme Court, 15 RUTGERS L.J. 573, 591-611 (1984) (discussing the solar energy
problem related to the construction of housing pursuant to a Mount Laurel decision).
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the Mount Laurel Doctrine see it as within the court's legitima-
cy,40 others define the New Jersey Supreme Court's role as one
of a "mini-legislature."4' Ironically, the Mount Laurel Doctrine
shares another characteristic with some of its land-use siblings:
all have been criticized as having "gone too far."4 According to
the harshest critics, the Mount Laurel Doctrine violates stan-
dards of popular sovereignty,4" separation of powers,4 and
good "judging."45 For the advocates of Mount Laurel, the trans-
gressions are not as great as the benefits. To them, the su-
preme court is an effective vehicle of social policy.
Professor Charles Haar's book, Suburbs Under Siege,46 is a
treatise on the judiciary's ability and duty to combat
exclusionary zoning. Tracing the history of Mount Laurel and
its progeny, Suburbs is convincing in its insistence that the
judiciary is the correct instrument to effect social change. Ac-
cording to Haar, the role of the judiciary is that of a problem
solver. Thus, the court's intervention was appropriate because
the legislative and executive branches were deadlocked. The
court's intervention was necessary because, as in other cases of
institutional reform, the court is a last resort.
Certainly, successful rationalization of the Mount Laurel
Doctrine is related to the value one places on correcting the
40. See infra part IV.
41. See Lawrence Berger, Inclusionary Zoning Devices as Takings: The Legacy of
the Mt. Laurel Cases, 70 NEB. L. REv. 186, 195 (1991) (quoting Simon Rifldn, Are We
Asking Too Much of Our Courts?, 15 JUDGES J. 43 (1976)).
42. Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922). See generally M &
J Coal Co. v. United States, 47 F.3d 1148, 1153 (D.C. Cir. 1995); Loveladies Harbor,
Inc. v. United States, 28 F.3d 1171, 1176 (D.C. Cir. 1994); Florida Rock Indus. v.
United States, 18 F.3d 1560, 1568 (D.C. Cir. 1994); Smithfield Concerned Citizens for
Fair Zoning v. Town of Smithfield, 907 F.2d 239, 242 (1st Cir. 1990); Plantation
Landing Resort, Inc. v. United States, 30 Ct. Cl. 63, 69 (1993).
43. See infra part III.A.
44. See infra part III.B.
45. See infra part III.C.; Payne, supra note 32, at 27 (1987) ("[J]udging... is to
apply fixed rules rather than to make discretionary choices."); see also John J. Farm-
er, Jr., Mitigating "The Frailties of Human Judgment": Justice Robert Clifford and the
Sources of Judicial Legitimacy, 25 SETON HALL L. REV. 1027, 1045 (1995) (to reduce
the frailties of human judgments, opinions should be "susceptible of concise expression
and clean interpretation so that they can aid in predictive art and persuade society
that the decision is correct.").
46. CHARLES M. HAAR, SUBURBS UNDER SIEGE: RACE, SPACE AND AUDACIOUS
JUDGES (1996) [hereinafter SUBURBS].
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social problems created by exclusionary zoning. For Haar,
exclusionary zoning has contributed to the "fragmentation and
stratification of metropolitan areas into inner cities and prolifer-
ating suburbs."' This restructuring of the inner cities and
suburbs has, in turn, created a "de facto apartheid" that incar-
cerates the inner cities' residents.' Suburbs sets up the bal-
ance so that it tips heavily in favor of judicial activism. Sub-
urbs concedes that affirmative remedies set out by the New
Jersey Supreme Court are extraordinary in their breadth and
scope,49 but concludes they are necessary for the social prob-
lems at issue.
This paper analyzes Suburbs's response to the recent criti-
cisms of the Mount Laurel Doctrine. In Part II, the major
themes of Suburbs are discussed. The three major criticisms of
the Mount Laurel Doctrine-the violation of separation of pow-
ers, notion of sovereignty and good judging-are set out in Part
III. Part IV examines Suburbs's responses to these major criti-
cisms. Finally, Part V argues that Suburbs is successful in
showing that the role of the judiciary in the Mount Laurel
Doctrine was necessary and appropriate.
II. SUBURBS
Suburbs continues major themes expressed in Haar's earlier
works by underscoring the nexus between the judiciary and
socially responsible land-use planning.0 Although the themes
47. Id. at 4.
48. See id. at 6.
49. See infra parts rVA and B.
50. See CHARLES M. HAAR & DANIEL W. FESSLER, THE WRONG SIDE OF THE
TRACKS 228 (1986) ('American cities and towns continue to distribute services inade-
quately and to deny participation to politically and economically disadvantaged citi-
zens. The challenge is to set about righting this wrong. To begin the process we
suggest state courts as the forum and the common law as the vehicle."); HAAR &
KAYDEN supra note 15, at 19-20 (While Justice Brennan believed that, "properly sup-
ported by sound planning, zoning is a positive instrument for the social economic and
physical well-being of communities," he also thought that the "court's role should be
limited, but only as long as there was evidence that the zoning was the product and
reflection of sound planning."); CHARLES M. HAAR & MICHAEL ALLAN WOLF, LAND-USE
PLANNING: A CASEBOOK ON THE USE, MISUSE AND RE-USE OF URBAN LAND 89-91 (4th
ed. 1989) ("Where competing land interests vie to dominate, the court is the tradi-
tional forum for decision. Realistically evaluated within the framework of the conven-
1996] 1099
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are similar, the message of Haar's Suburbs is unlike that of its
predecessors. The stakes of the game in Suburbs are much
higher; the practical effect of the Mount Laurel Doctrine is that
it serves as informal precedent throughout the country for both
the walled suburbs and their excluded minority residents.
Therefore, Suburbs cannot afford to use the detached, theoreti-
cal tone characteristic of some of Haar's previous works. While
Suburbs is committed to proving that the judiciary must get
involved in the exclusionary zoning debate,5 it also points out
some of the flaws of the Mount Laurel Doctrine. In addition,
Suburbs elucidates the struggle that emerged between the legis-
lature and the judiciary and the applicability of some parts of
the Mount Laurel Doctrine to different contexts.
A. Winning the Battle but Losing the War
To Haar, the message of the Mount Laurel Doctrine remained
largely in the courtrooms. The courts' failure in gaining the
public's support of the Mount Laurel Doctrine was the result of
two errors. First, by predicating the right to fair housing on a
wealth classification, the court alienated African-Americans who
constituted the real victims of Mount Laurel. Second, in refus-
ing to take advantage of the media or engage in out of court
discussions, the court enveloped in secrecy the horrors behind
the Mount Laurel Doctrine and its social implications.
Trapped in its economic segregation language, the opinion
left African-Americans estranged from the real purpose of the
Mount Laurel Doctrine: to bridge the gap between the ghetto
and the suburb. The clearing of a constitutional stumbling
block, while necessary for the Mount Laurel Doctrine's success,
had its price. Justice Frederick W. Hall's careful manipulation
of the language of Mount Laurel I accomplished its goal of
thwarting federal judicial review by hinging the right to a fair
opportunity to housing on economic segregation instead of racial
segregation,5 which would have triggered review under the
tional syntax in which the courts operate, such decisions may be regarded as plan-
ning and zoning by the judiciary.").
51. See infra parts III & IV.
52. Mount Laurel I, 336 A.2d 713, 717.
Plaintiffs represent the minority group poor (black and Hispanic) seeking
1100
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equal protection clause. However, it had the effect of ultimately
distancing African-Americans from the Mount Laurel Doctrine:
[T]he Mount Laurel opinion may have fanned the flames of
racial fear by not paying enough attention to it. Unfortu-
nately, Chief Justice Wilentz believed in integration per se
as a constitutional imperative and a societal goal. But the
race issue was muted in his opinion; economic segregation
was its dominant theme. Racial isolation, and its relation to
class distinctions as the prime evil of exclusionary zoning,
needed open discussion, not silent skirting."
As a sad testament to the effects of avoiding the race issue,
Suburbs recalls a story in which four months after being placed
in a Yonkers neighborhood by a federal judge, African-Ameri-
cans and their white neighbors had not yet exchanged greet-
ings.' Suburbs argues that the Mount Laurel Doctrine should
have induced resentment. In avoiding the race issue, Mount
Laurel I may have inspired resentment instead of interaction.
Plagued by the tradition of solemnity, the Mount Laurel
courts were reluctant to show the public the ugliness of
exclusionary zoning. Without seeing the converted chicken coops
of Springville-the unsightly homes of some of the Mount Lau-
rel plaintiffs-the general audience would remain unmoved to
the court's plight. As a special master in other institutional
litigation,55 Haar is adamant that "[c]onvincing the public of
such quarters. But they are not the only category of persons barred from
so many municipalities by reason of restrictive land use regulations. We
have reference to young and elderly couples, single persons and large,
growing families not in the poverty class, but who still cannot afford the
only kinds of housing realistically permitted in most places-relatively
high-priced, single-family detached dwellings on sizeable lots and, in some
municipalities, expensive apartments. We will not, therefore, consider the
case from the wider viewpoint that the effect of Mount Laurel's land use
regulation has been to prevent various categories of persons from living
in the township because of the limited extent of their income and re-
sources.
Id. (citations omitted).
53. See SUBURBS supra note 46, at 169.
54. See id. at 167-68.
55. Quincy v. Metropolitan Dist. Council, No. 138,477 (Mass. Super. Ct., Dec. 17,
1982) (involving cleanup of Boston Harbor); Board of Educ. v. Boston, 434 N.E.2d
1224 (Mass. 1982); School Comm. v. Boston, 421 N.E.2d 1187 (Mass. 1981) (involving
funding of Boston public schools).
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the rightness of the court's actions is an essential element of
any remedy."56 By taking representatives of the press and tele-
vision media on tours of Deer Island while he was master on
the Boston Harbor cleanup case,57 Haar was able to use the
public's attention to garner judicial support.
Finally, Haar supports revision of the canon of judicial eth-
ics" to allow judges in institutional litigation to respond to
concerns their opinions may generate.59 Recognizing that few
"read lengthy legal opinions,"" Haar underscores the near
impossibility of communicating the broad ideals of the Mount
Laurel Doctrine to the public. "[T]he vision of a society based
on diversity, plurality, and tolerance, couched in broad, consti-
tutional terms such as general welfare, is a message that judges
must not merely enunciate but also imbue with life and imme-
diacy."61
It is speculative what substantive effect the court's failure to
garner public support for the Mount Laurel Doctrine had on its
overall success against the legislature. "Although the court was
not likely to hold on indefinitely to the central position of lead-
ership that it enjoyed at the outset of the exclusionary zoning
battle, its diminished strength may be partly attributable to its
own unwillingness to direct the public's imagination in salutary
directions."62 It is clear that the lack of support from public
interest groups could have been part of the downfall. After
clearing substantial hurdles that barred potential plaintiffs, the
courts seemed to be begging for actions brought by public inter-
est groups. "Had there been more visible support from public
interest groups, the court might have struggled harder to make
the actions of the three trial judges more broadly applicable
56. SUBURBS, supra note 46, at 145.
57. See id. at 172.
58. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 3(A)(6) (1989).
A judge should abstain from public comment about a pending or impending
proceeding in any court, and should require similar abstention on the part of court
personnel subject to his direction and control. This subsection does not prohibit judges
from making public statements in the course of their official duties or from explain-
ing for public information the procedures of the court. Id.
59. See id. at 173.
60. See id. at 172.
61. Id. at 173.
62. Id. at 162.
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and to elaborate still further the principles of its doctrine."63
B. The Ripostes of the Legislature and Judiciary
What the judiciary had begun in Mount Laurel I and II did
not go unnoticed by the municipalities. For many New Jersey
residents, restrictive ordinances were appreciated for their abili-
ty to "keep[ ] land prices up, tax rates down, and undesirables
out."" As the ordinances began to fall, the municipalities
looked to the legislature for help. At that time, "the priority
with the greatest urgency was finding some alternative to the
judges; they wished to cast off the court's mandate."65 Al-
though appearing irreconcilable, the ensuing tangle between the
legislative and judicial branches reveals a shared commitment
to the goals set out in Mount Laurel H.66
To Haar, the battle between the two branches started after
the New Jersey Supreme Court's decision in In re Egg Harbor
Associates.7 There, the court determined that the legislature,
through New Jersey's Coastal Area Facility Review (CAFRA),"
had conferred power on the Department of Environmental Pro-
tection (DEP) to zone for the general welfare.69 Thus, the court
stated, DEP "had the right, under CAFRA, to require develop-
ers to provide an appropriate amount of housing for low- and
moderate-income households."" The court acknowledged that
its broad interpretation of CAFRA could result in conflicts be-
tween DEP and municipalities, but justified its action based on
the larger goal of housing reform."'
63. Id. at 98.
64. Id. at 90.
65. Id.
66. 456 A.2d 390.
67. 464 A.2d 1115 (N.J. 1983). In Egg Harbor, the court approved a coastal zone
development plan on the condition that a mandatory set-aside of 20% for low- and
middle-income housing units be constructed. See id. at 1120.
68. N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 13:19-1 to -21 (West 1991).
69. "Although CAFRA is primarily an environmental protection statute, the pow-
ers delegated to DEP extend well beyond protection of the natural environment." Egg
Harbor, 464 A.2d at 1118.
70. SUBURBS, supra note 46, at 91.
71. See Egg Harbor, 464 A.2d at 1119.
We acknowledged that, in fulfilling its obligation with respect to low and
moderate income housing, "mandatory set-asides keyed to the construction
1996] 1103
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Two years after Egg Harbor the Fair Housing Act (FHA)72
was passed. The FHA was calculated to diffuse the power of
the judiciary. Three significant steps towards this goal were the
FHA's creation of the Council on Affordable Housing (COAH),73
the Regional Contribution Agreement (RCA),74 and its treat-
ment of the builder's remedy.75 According to Suburbs, these
provisions carried a two-fold effect. "In the FHA, the New Jer-
sey legislature seemed determined not just to supplant the
courts as program administrators but to alter, in significant
aspects, the nature of the regional fair share housing obliga-
tions that could be imposed on communities."76
In order to continue its participation in the enforcement of
the Mount Laurel Doctrine, the judiciary needed to return the
of lower income housing, are constitutional and within the zoning power
of a municipality." [T]he DEP requirement that 20% of the housing be
for low and moderate income residents is just such a mandatory set-
aside.
Id. at 1119-20 (quoting Mount Laurel II, 456 A.2d at 390).
72. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 52:27D-301 (West Supp. 1996).
73. Id. § 52:27D-305. The FHA charged the COAH with determining "housing
regions of the State," "the present and prospective need for low and moderate income
housing at the State and regional levels," and "[aidopt[ing] criteria and guidelines for.
(1) [m]unicipal determination of its present and prospective fair share of the housing
need in a given region." Id. § 52:27D-307(a)-(c)(1).
In addition, the COAH provided an alternative forum for Mount Laurel cases.
See id. § 52:27D-316. The COAH was given the power to issue a "substantive certifi-
cation" which meant that the municipality's "fair share plan is ... not inconsistent
with achievement of low and moderate income housing needs of the region. . . ." and
that the "affirmative measures in the housing element and implementation plan make
the achievement of the municipality's fair share of low and moderate income housing
realistically possible.. . ." Id. § 52:27D-314(a), (b).
74. Id. § 52:27D-312. The RCA provides, "A municipality may propose the transfer
of up to 50% of its fair share to another municipality within its housing region." Id.
75. Id. § 52:27D-328 (West 1986). The FHA provided that no builders' remedies
shall be granted to "a plaintiff in any exclusionary zoning litigation which has been
filed on or after January 20, 1983, unless a final judgment providing for a builder's
remedy has already been rendered to that plaintiff." Id. The ban on builders' reme-
dies lasted for four months.
In addition, the FHA provided that a municipality's fair share would be ad-
justed if the "established pattern of development in the community would be drasti-
cally altered." Id. § 52:27D-307(c)(2)(b).
Finally, the FHA provided for a cap on the "aggregate number of units which
may be allocated to a municipality as its fair share of the region's present and pro-
spective need for low and moderate income housing." Id. § 52:27D-307(e). Today, that
cap is 1000 units. See id.
76. SUBURBS, supra note 46, at 93.
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legislature's serve.7" In light of the FHA's enactment, however,
the judiciary was faced with a dilemma: how could it assure
that the obligations of the Mount Laurel Doctrine were carried
out, thereby preserving the judiciary's initial role, while remain-
ing in the constraints imposed by the FHA? In three decisions
after Egg Harbor,7" the New Jersey Supreme Court was able
to uphold the constitutionality of the FHA while still maintain-
ing its ground as the "superpower" in the area of remedying
exclusionary zoning."
A troika of cases after Egg Harbor signify the New Jersey
judiciary's gradual regaining of power. In the first case, Hills
Development Co. v. Township of Bernards,0 the New Jersey
Supreme Court apparently acceded to the legislature's emerging
role in enforcing the Mount Laurel Doctrine.8 While the court,
77. See id. at 117.
78. See supra notes 63-66 and accompanying text.
79. See SUBURBS, supra note 46, at 125.
80. 510 A.2d 621 (N.J. 1986). In Hills, builders of 12 townships and boroughs
(Bernards, Bernardsville, Cranbury, Denville, Franklin, Holmdel, Monroe, Piscataway,
Randolph, South Plainfield, Tewksbury, and Warren) had applied for transfer of
Mount Laurel litigation to the COAH. Except for Tewksbury Township, transfer was
denied in each case. See id. at 635. The builders brought an action compelling the
New Jersey Supreme Court to rule on the validity of the trial court's motions. See id.
at 634-35. Five of the townships (Bernards, Cranbury, Denville, Randolph and
Tewksbury) were selected as representative of the 12 original plaintiff builder's
claims. See id. at 635.
Central to the builders' claims was the interpretation of section 16 of the FHA
which mandates transfer to the COAH any Mount Laurel litigation commenced more
than 60 days before the effective date of the FHA, unless the transfer would result
in "manifest injustice." See id. at 646, construing N.J. STAT. ANN. § 52:27D-316 (West
1986). The builders argued that the transfer would result in a delay in the "satisfac-
tion of the Mount Laurel constitutional obligation." Id. at 642. In addition, the build-
ers argued that "manifest injustice" would occur as a result of the "delay in produc-
ing low and moderate income housing caused by the transfer, as well as in the
builders' loss of expected profits." Id. at 636. Specifically, they argued that the delay
would "drastically affect the builder's business operations, which have depended on
high-volume production." Id. at 637.
The court first addressed the builders' claims, then went on to analyze the
FHA's contribution to the goals of the Mount Laurel Doctrine. In regard to the
builders' arguments about the transfer provision, the court stated that 'manifest
injustice' means injustice that is "unforeseen and exceptional." Id. at 647. Concerning
the FHA as a whole, the court declared that "[liegislative action was the relief we
asked for, and today we have it." Id. at 645.
81. 510 A.2d at 654 ("While the Legislature has left a continuing role under the
[FHAI for the judiciary in Mount Laurel matters, any such proceedings before a court
should conform wherever possible to the decisions, criteria, and guidelines of the
Council.").
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in Holmdel Builder's Association v. Township of Holmdel,82
again upheld the legitimacy of the FHA, it restated its commit-
ment to the goals set out in Mount Laurel I and II. In In re
Warren Township,83 some of the legitimacy the New Jersey
Supreme Court had granted to the COAH was retracted," and
the court's dominion over the Mount Laurel Doctrine was re-
gained.
The banter between the legislature and the judiciary reveals
their common goal of providing the best remedies to achieve the
aspirations of the Mount Laurel Doctrine. Suburbs argues that
while some may interpret the court's opinion in Hills as acqui-
escence, others might consider it to be a strategic move on the
part of the judiciary. 5 "Having performed the job of herald,
sounding the need for change, the court could retire with honor,
leaving the field to the legislature's FHA-the result it had
always sought."5 Suburbs suggests that overall the legislature
is better able to adapt to the municipalities' hardships:
Perhaps in being rubbed into reality's mud and forced to
confront individual circumstances, the courts would have
developed an adjustment methodology better tailored than
the FHA's to the realities of specific local situations. Yet
legislative fiat is undoubtedly a speedier, if rougher, way of
responding to the hardships that inevitably arise in the
82. 583 A.2d 277 (N.J. 1990). At issue in Holmdel was the constitutionality of
requiring builders to pay mandatory fees in order to get a permit. See id. at 281.
Stating that the COAH provided regulations that allowed a voluntary fee in exchange
for an offsetting incentive, such as a density bonus, the court found the fees to be
constitutional and statutorily authorized. See id. at 290-92, 295. In addition, the court
expressly stated that the fees were not inconsistent with the FHA See id. at 295.
83. 622 A.2d 1257 (N.J. 1993). The court, struck down a COAH regulation allow-
ing a municipality to grant an "occupancy preference for 50% of such housing to
income-eligible households that reside or work in the municipality." Id. at 1258. The
local preference had a disparate racial impact; the number of minorities in the region
was much greater than that in the municipality, thus the local preference had the
effect of favoring white households over minority households for newly constructed
affordable housing. See id. at 1259.
84. See id. at 1271 ("Notwithstanding the deference to which COAH is entitled in
adopting regulations to implement the expansive goals of the [FHA], we are unable to
find on this record that the occupancy preference furthers those legislative policies.").
85. See SUBURBS, supra note 46, at 96-98.
86. Id. at 97.
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application of a uniform rule such as the Mount Laurel
Doctrine."
In a way, the back and forth witnessed between the legislature
and the judiciary served the important function of assuring that
the most efficient remedy, or "carrot," would be used.
Likewise, the New Jersey Supreme Court's handling of the
COAH in Holmdel and Warren signifies its desire to remain a
"superpower" in the area of land-use planning,8 8 and yet share
the burden with the COAH of deciding a municipality's compli-
ance with the Mount Laurel Doctrine.89 Suburbs states that,
"[e]ven when the legislature moves in with its enactments,
seeking to preempt the field, it cannot relegate the judiciary to
a backwater."9" Still, the court does not appear interested in
carrying on its shoulders the weight of assuring compliance
with the Mount Laurel Doctrine. By deferring to the COAH's
fee ordinance regulation in Holmdel, the court "lent the agency
its own mantle of power."9'
C. Applying Tenets of the Mount Laurel Doctrine in Other
Contexts
Suburbs suggests that the Mount Laurel Doctrine may have
use outside the specific context of New Jersey's land-use dilem-
ma.9" Unfortunately, the exclusionary zoning practices of
Mount Laurel Township are not uncommon. Many other munic-
ipalities throughout the United States share with the residents
of Mount Laurel the frustration of balancing the have's with
the have-not's. In addition to its articulation of specific reme-
dies, the Mount Laurel Doctrine contains ideals that could be
applied to other contexts. The fact that municipalities will con-
tinue to face the same dilemma, as did Mount Laurel Town-
ship, provides a strong argument for the persuasiveness of the
Mount Laurel Doctrine.
87. See id. at 110.
88. See id. at 125.
89. See id. at 123-24.
90. Id. at 125.
91. Id. at 118.
92. See id.
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The New Jersey Supreme Court's "broad redefinition of the
term general welfare" intimates that municipalities outside New
Jersey may have the responsibility to zone for the region, and
not for their own welfare.9 The Mount Laurel Doctrine stands
for the proposition that a suburb shall not hide under the aus-
pices of the police power of the state while trying to "maintain
itself as an enclave of affluence or of social homogeneity."94
Thus, suburbs will be unable to keep out certain classes and
races through laws that require houses with minimum lots or
floor space. Each municipality will have to consider how it will
provide for its share of the region's housing needs. In a particu-
larly apocalyptic way, Haar writes that suburbs "may not refuse
to confront the future by building moats around themselves and
pulling up the drawbridge."9
In addition, the Mount Laurel cases imply that local regula-
tions that have extra-local effects should not be granted the
presumption of validity that historically has been given.9 The
Mount Laurel Doctrine provides a basis for states to more
strictly review ordinances that are locally enacted, but that car-
ry extralocal implications. First, the New Jersey Supreme Court
showed that it would alter the rational basis test-the level of
review under which most local ordinances are upheld-if the
ordinance involved an issue of "fundamental import."97 Haar
suggests that the "willingness" showed by the court could ex-
tend "to other issues of metropolis-wide concern, such as air
pollution, the location of waste treatment plants, or the build-
ing of hospitals, sewer systems, or other major facilities."98
Second, the court made it significantly easier for one to at-
tack the legislative validity of an ordinance.9 By focusing on
the effect of the municipality's regulation, rather than the mo-
tive and intent, the court removed the significant hurdle of
proving a municipality's desire to exclude others.' 0 Ordinanc-
93. Id. at 193.
94. Id.
95. Id.







es do not need to be made with racial intent, they need only
affect a municipality in a discriminatory way.
Obviously, the Mount Laurel Doctrine is not binding authori-
ty on other states. Suburbs offers a rational explanation why
states may choose to follow it.
What makes the Mount Laurel dilemma so poignant is that
the court's crafting of one principle-the ideal of equality of
opportunity regardless of race, ethnicity, or income-clashed
with another highly valued article of faith: people's deeply
rooted belief in their right to defend bastions against would-
be invaders. The suburban enclave is a continuation of the
old idea-strong in American tradition-of the preeminence
of the local community. Home rule, grassroots, the right of
association, and neighborhood invincibility, are basic build-
ing blocks of local government .arrangements. The Mount
Laurel Doctrine, with its emphasis on the fairness of equal
sharing of the burdens of metropolitan existence and equal
access to the suburban lifestyle, challenges all these ten-
ets. 01
Simply, every municipality faces the dilemma encountered by
the township of Mount Laurel.102 Assuring the reader that
Mount Laurel is not a singular experience, Haar writes: "[b]orn
out of a singular mandate to interpret and guarantee the con-
stitutional rights of all Americans, the judicial vision represent-
ed by the Mount Laurel experience offers a signal lesson for
reducing the economic and social chasm arising from the isola-
tion of the poor in central cities . ,,"o' Thus, the applicabili-
ty of the Mount Laurel Doctrine may only be limited by a par-
ticular municipality's ability to look beyond its walls. As Haar
writes, "No longer is our prime task to tend our gar-
dens-unless we take a more expansive view of the garden's
extent."'0 4
101. See id at 9.
102. Not every state, however, has chosen to build housing in the suburbs for its
low- and moderate-income residents. For example, Oregon established a Land Con-
servation and Development Commission with the goal of revitalizing the urban areas.
See OR. REv. STAT. §§ 197.030-.040, -.175 (1989).
103. SUBURBS, supra note 46, at xiv.
104. Id. at 193.
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III. CRITICISMS OF THE MOUNT LAUREL DOCTRINE
The criticism of the Mount Laurel Doctrine can be divided
into three major concerns. First, according to opponents, the
Mount Laurel Doctrine violated the constitutional notion of
separation of powers. The New Jersey Supreme Court issued
remedies that resembled legislation and required administrative
mechanisms to implement. Second, the Mount Laurel Doctrine
was the product of an unaccountable judiciary. Because they
were not elected, the judges were able to act capriciously. Final-
ly, the Mount Laurel Doctrine, as the product of the adjudicato-
ry process, represented a simplistic solution to a complex social
problem. The judiciary is not the appropriate place for the set-
ting of a complex social problem such as exclusionary zoning,
due to a lack of information, the nature of the judicial process,
and the inherent short-sightedness of judicial decision-making.
A. Separation of Powers
The doctrine of separation of powers is grounded on the no-
tion that each branch must work efficiently in order to be
effective."10 The structure and unique characteristics of each
branch lend themselves to the role that the branch performs,
and in turn, the branch creates its own legitimacy in perform-
ing particular duties. When a branch usurps the duties of an-
other branch, the doctrine is violated and two results occur:
both branches are deemed to be working inefficiently and the
legitimacy of both branches is undermined. For these reasons,
critics of the Mount Laurel Doctrine agree that the judiciary
was not the correct forum for solving a complex problem such
as exclusionary zoning."6 They argue that the Mount Laurel
105. "Montesquieu had offered two distinct justifications for organizing government
on principles of separation of powers: such a structure prevents the concentration of
power, thereby discouraging tyranny: in addition, it makes possible specialization of
function, thereby furthering efficient government. The American vision of separation of
powers enthusiastically embraced the efficiency as well as the control strand of
Montesquieu's theory." Cynthia R. Farina, Statutory Interpretation and the Balance of
Power in the Administrative State, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 452, 521 (1989) (footnote omit-
ted).
106. Notably, it was in Oakwood at Madison, Inc. v. Township of Madison that the
New Jersey Supreme Court recognized that the solution to the Mount Laurel problem
.should be taken elsewhere." 371 A-2d 1192, 1268 (N.J. 1977) (Clifford, J., concur-
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Doctrine's creation of intricate remedies and an administrative
scheme to implement the remedies constituted an intrusion into
both the legislative and executive branches of government.
These impositions not only expended the resources of the judi-
ciary, but they detracted from the legitimacy of both branches.
1. Intrusion into the Legislative Branch
The Mount Laurel Doctrine was complex in its remedial
scope. It imposed on municipalities the burden of providing
mandatory set-asides 1 and "least-cost" housing. 8 Manda-
tory set-asides were "inclusionary device[s]" designed to compel
developers to meet the region's fair share obligations. 9
"Least-cost" housing was a fall-back position of the Mount Lau-
rel court that was triggered after courts recognized that "[t]here
may be municipalities where special conditions such as ex-
tremely high land use costs make it impossible for the fair
share obligation to be met even after all excessive restrictions
and exactions ... have been removed.""0 Mandatory set-
asides and least-cost housing both entail calculations of vari-
ables such as regional fair share and price on the conventional
suburban housing market. They serve as examples of the
Mount Laurel Doctrine "resembl[ing] . . . a piece of detailed
legislation.""'
Exclusionary zoning in general, and the calculation of the
regional housing need, are necessarily public policy issues. The
issues are not black and white, but often entail foresight that
only an urban planner has. The more complicated the problem,
the more an inexperienced, unknowledgeable court is forced to
predict the result. The court has neither the time nor the ex-
pertise to foresee future implications of zoning ordinances and
thus is compelled to guess the possible consequences of zoning
ring).
107. See Mount Laurel II, 456 A.2d 390, 446-50.
108. Id. at 451-52.
109. Id. at 446.
110. Id. at 451.
111. Fernandez, supra note 33, at 360.
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decisions. As one opponent suggests, these "predictions and
calculations... subsume public policy decisions completely out-
side the scope of the judicial mandate.""'
Critics of the Mount Laurel Doctrine assert that exclusionary
zoning is the result of a political process and thus should be
changed only as a result of the political process."' Zoning is
the legislative manifestation of a social goal. While the intended
effect of the social goal, the exclusion of lower-income people, is
not palatable to society, it nevertheless is a valid articulation of
an appointed body, the zoning board. The judiciary is not a
proxy for the political process, but the Mount Laurel court still
"substituted its judgment for that of the political process, in
effect re-prioritizing social goals as ordered by zoning decision
makers.""4
By forcing itself into the realms of the other branches, the
New Jersey Supreme Court caused its legitimacy to wane.
When the public recognizes that the court has usurped the au-
thority to promulgate zoning ordinances, it will not feel as
bound by these ordinances."' Likewise, lower courts will not
feel that they are bound to those courts that do not "conform to
and abide by accepted legal principles limiting their
authority."" 6
2. Intrusion into the Executive Branch
A court's involvement with the process of effecting social
change does not just end with the creation of a remedial
scheme. The administration of the remedy can also trigger a
separation-of-powers claim because of a court's usurpation of
the executive branch's enforcement power. The Mount Laurel
112. Rose, supra note 19, at 829 (1988).
113. Rose, supra note 35, at 870. "[O]nce planning studies are made and profes-
sional evaluations of those studies are offered, the planning process must be contin-
ued in a forum comprised of elected representatives who possess the democratic and
constitutional authority to make policy decisions." Id.
114. Sebastian C. Pugliese, III, Comment, Environmental Justice: Lowering Barriers
to Participation, 1995 Wis. L. REV. 1177, 1204. "[t]he adjudicatory process must con-
tinue to expend resources in attempting to achieve the desired social goal". Id. at
1205.
115. Rose, supra note 35, at 885.
116. Id.
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Doctrine, by committing itself to achieving the desired end
(inclusionary zoning) by any means necessary, was compelled to
enforce its own complex ruling."'
Faced with limited resources, the Mount Laurel courts could
not afford to enforce their own remedies. One of the frustra-
tions the Mount Laurel 1I court had was with the "high cost of
the Mount Laurel I issues.""' Mount Laurel I issues were not
as complex as the issues that arose out of Mount Laurel H."
Taking on the additional step of administering the remedies
expended so much of the court's resources that the judicial pro-
cess was literally overwhelmed.'
* The Mount Laurel courts, in the absence of a "complete and
enforceable rule," created a right to affordable housing out of
the state constitution. " The implications of creating constitu-
tional rights are significant.2 Expending resources and in-
truding in the domain of the legislature and the executive
branches, the Mount Laurel courts disregarded other viable
options.' Although it would involve a break in the litigation,
117. See Fernandez, supra note 33, at 360 (discussing the "court's appropriation of
legislative and executive powers in enforcing this constitutional provision."); Rose,
supra note 35, at 873 (stating that the Mount Laurel Doctrine intrudes into the exec-
utive branch when it forces trial courts to set up administrative mechanisms to de-
termine rent issues); Pugliese, supra note 113, at 1204-05.
118. Rose, supra note 19, at 828. Rose portrays the Mount Laurel II court as a
petulant child frustrated with municipalities' stubbornness in obeying the court's rul-
ing in Mount Laurel L Notably, Rose suggests that the court was worried that it
would lose 'jurisdiction and control of its policy and program against exclusionary
zoning." Id.
119. While Mount Laurel I set out what was to be done, Mount Laurel IFs pur-
pose was to put "some steel in [Mount Laurel I]." Mount Laurel II, 456 A.2d 390,
410. Chief Justice Robert N. Wilentz wrote:
We have learned from experience, however, that unless a strong judicial
hand is used, Mount Laurel [/] will not result in housing, but in paper,
process, witnesses, trials and appeals. We intend by this decision to
strengthen it, clarify it, and make it easier for public officials, including
judges, to apply it.
Id. If length is any indication of complexity, it should be noted that Mount Laurel
Il's opinion ran 120 pages.
120. Rose, supra note 19, at 822; see also infra part III.C.
121. Fernandez, supra note 33, at 361; see also supra note 34.
122. See generally, Tarr & Harrison, supra note 24.
123. See Pugliese, supra note 113, at 1205. Pugliese suggests that an executive
order may have been appropriate in the Mount Laurel cases because it would
shoulder the "prohibitive cost of data characterizing any link between undesirable
land uses and health and environmental effects." Id. (citation omitted). It seems,
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using an executive order would have avoided a separation-of-
powers argument and saved the court valuable resources.
B. Popular Sovereignty
Opponents argue that the Mount Laurel judiciary is not ac-
countable for its rulings. Owing to affirmative steps taken by
the Mount Laurel II court" and the setup of the New Jersey
judiciary," Mount Laurel courts enjoyed insulation from criti-
cism from the federal courts 2 ' (judicial review) or the major-
ity (countermajoritarian dilemma).
1. Avoiding Judicial Review
The Mount Laurel courts eluded federal judicial review by
basing their rulings solely on state constitutional issues. 7
The New Jersey Constitution contains neither a due process
clause nor an equal protection provision, yet the Mount Laurel
II court needed to craft a right to affordable housing so that it
could legitimately create and implement remedies to achieve its
goal. Thus, the court crafted a right to affordable housing out of
the general welfare clause of the constitution. 2 ' Although the
Supreme Court of New Jersey has "the capacity to create neces-
sary definitions or procedures" to aid in "the enforce[ing] of a
constitutional provision,"" 9 the use of these definitions as a
bulwark from legitimate review elicits caution."'
however, that in the case of Mount Laurel, the data was available to the judiciary,
thus making obsolete the need for further information.
124. See generally Mount Laurel II, 456 A.2d 390 (N.J. 1983); Rose, supra note 35,
at 835, 855.
125. See DAVID L. KIRP ET AL., OUR TOWN: RACE, HOUSING AND THE SOUL OF
SUBURBIA 63-112 (1995).
126. See Berger, supra note 41, at 190.
127. See Township of Mount Laurel v. Southern Burlington County NAACP, 423
U.S. 808 (1975) (dismissing appeal and denying certiorari).
128. See supra note 34.
129. Fernandez, supra note 33, at 361.
130. See Rose, supra note 35, at 835, 865. "[T]he 'real' due process and equal pro-
tection clauses in the Federal Constitution create genuine legal problems." Id. Specifi-
cally, Rose argues that the mandatory set asides portion of the ruling is in violation
of the equal protection clause because of its "confiscatory impact taken together with
evidence illustrating the limited effectiveness of the regulation in achieving its objec-
tive." Id. at 866. Mandatory set-asides unreasonably discriminated against the class
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In order to avoid intermediate review from the state judicia-
ry, the Mount Laurel II limited the jurisdiction of Mount Laurel
cases to only three trial court judges,'' and made appeals of
these decisions direct to the supreme court.'32 This "manipula-
tion of judicial personnel" ensured that an independent trial
judge who disagreed with the Mount Laurel Doctrine never sat
for a Mount Laurel trial. 3 With the fixing of interlocutory
appeals, the facts and law of Mount Laurel cases received a
non-rigorous review by the court that promulgated the original
ruling."4 In addition, the period of finality for Mount Laurel
cases was set for six years, although a concession was made for
extenuating factual circumstances.'35
According to critics, by defending its opinion from scrutiny,
the supreme court has perpetuated the belief in the minds of
the public that the correct role for the court is that of a "mini-
legislature.""6 Under the remedies created in Mount Laurel
II, it would be extremely rare for a Mount Laurel case to be
overturned or even criticized. By building up a record of consis-
tent holdings, Mount Laurel courts would establish an impres-
sive precedent. For the public, the consistent treatment of mu-
nicipalities would create the impression that there was some-
thing other than judicially created support for the Mount Laurel
Doctrine. The public's impression that the Mount Laurel Doc-
trine was a judicial mandate that received "widespread judicial
support"' 7 would foster the notion that the courts are ade-
quate problem-solvers.
2. Countermajoritarian Dilemma
The justices on the New Jersey Supreme Court are appointed
for a period of seven years, then receive life terms should their
by making a small component--the developers or owners of real estate and/or the
purchasers or renters of the housing units"-bear the burden of providing for a re-
gional housing need. Id.; see also id. at 879.
131. Mount Laurel II, 456 A-2d 390, 419.
132. See id. at 458.
133. Rose, supra note 19, at 831.
134. See id.
135. Mount Laurel II, 456 A.2d at 458.
136. Berger, supra note 41, at 195.
137. Rose, supra note 19, at 831.
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appointments be successfully reconfirmed by the Senate.13
Policymaking had long been a part of the supreme court's histo-
ry.'39 One justice remarked that the court's power of persua-
sion is legend: "we can encourage the [state] legislature to pass
laws or taxes without directing them to do that. This is the
wonder of our system, and besides it works to accomplish our
judicial objectives." "' The objectives of the supreme court
need not coincide with the objectives of the majority. In his
seminal work, The Least Dangerous Branch, Alexander Bickel
terms this controversy the countermajoritarian dilemma.'"
The New Jersey Supreme Court certainly had "no democratic
mandate to make public policy decisions."' Any sense of ac-
countability, therefore, had to come from the justices' own sense
that the their rulings were violating basic notions of judicial
restraint.' For an activist bench such as the New Jersey Su-
preme Court,' M however, accountability is more an anathema
138. See N.J. CONST. art. VI, § 6, para. 3 (1947).
139. See KIRP ET AL., supra note 125, at 63-65. The history of the New Jersey
Supreme Court is noteworthy. In 1947, New Jersey's state courts, once the epitome of
the common-law court system, began their transformation from the "nation's worst" to
a hotbed of activism. Id. Arthur Vanderbilt, a former president of the American Bar
Association and dean of the University of New York Law School, instituted reform
that would end the history of the courts being used as the governor's lackeys.
Vanderbilt believed that policymaking was "the proper business of state judges ...
because the law 'derives its life and growth from judicial decisions which . ..aban-
don an old rule or substitute ... a new one in order to meet new conditions.'" Id. at
64.
Chief Justice Joseph Weintraub, who succeeded William Brennan on the bench,
said that the supreme court has a "creative responsibility for making law." Id. at 64.
Weintraub recognized the ramifications of creating law when he exclaimed before
leaving the bench prior to the rehearing of Mount Laurel I, "Cases of this magnitude
should be decided by [judges] who have to live with the decisions." Id. at 78.
140. Id. at 64-65.
141. ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT
AT THE BAR OF POLITICS 16 (2d ed. 1986). Bickel's countermajoritarian difficulty oc-
curs as a result of the judiciary not being an elected body. They are not accountable
to the majority when they "invalidate" majoritarian difficulties.
In those states with elected judiciaries, a "majoritarian difficulty" would apply.
The majoritarian difficulty is how "elected judges can be justified in a regime commit-
ted to constitutionalism." Steven P. Croley, The Majoritarian Difficulty: Elective Judi-
ciaries and the Rule of Law, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 689, 694 (1995).
142. Rose, supra note 19, at 821.
143. See Oakwood at Madison v. Madison Township, 371 A.2d 1192, 1268 (N.J.
1977).
144. See Lionshead Lake v. Township of Wayne, 80 A.2d 650 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law
Div. 1951) (striking down minimum living space requirements for residential dwell-
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than a duty. For this reason, critics argue that the Mount Lau-
rel Doctrine "may rest upon little more than a set of undeclared
and elusive principles of social, economic, and political philoso-
phy of the members of the court."'
C. The Adjudicatory Process
After the dust had settled, it was not known whether the
public, the ultimate audience of the Mount Laurel Doctrine,
would get its message. While there are no established criteria
for dissemination of an opinion or doctrine, according to some,
the Mount Laurel Doctrine is not what the public views as
"good judging."4 ' According to the leading critics of Mount
Laurel Doctrine, good judging is the "appl[ication of] fixed rules
rather than [the making of] discretionary choices."'47 The ad-
judicatory model is inapposite to the idea of good judging. The
Mount Laurel Doctrine was the product of ill-informed judges,
subject to the rigid rules of court procedure and too simple to
be a real remedy for such a complex problem.
1. Judges With Only Generalized Knowledge
The Mount Laurel litigation demanded specific knowledge of
the art and science of planning. The lingo, ideas and concepts
of land use were relatively new to the judges. Calculating re-
gions and fair shares was not in the intellectual domain of the
justices.' To combat this problem, Mount Laurel II divided
New Jersey into three parts and "authorized ... a single judge,
who would be responsible for determining everything from lia-
bility to remedy in a single proceeding." It was intended
that the Mount Laurel judges "would develop the expertise
ings), rev'd, 89 A.2d 693 (N.J. 1952), appeal dismissed, 344 U.S. 919 (1953);
Brookdale Homes v. Johnson, 10 A.2d 477 (N.J. Sup. Ct. 1940) (striking down min-
imum building height requirements for residential dwellings), affd, 19 A.2d 868 (N.J.
1941).
145. Rose, supra note 19, at 855.
146. See Payne, supra note 32.
147. Id. at 27.
148. See Rose, supra note 19, at 821; see also DONALD L. HOROWITZ, THE COURTS
AND SOCIAL POLICY 25 (1977).
149. KMiP ET AL., supra note 125, at 102.
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needed to handle this complex litigation."'' 0 By combatting a
general lack of knowledge, Mount Laurel II was able to stack
the deck against any possible tampering with the doctrine they
had laid out in Mount Laurel I.151
The Mount Laurel 11 court also sanctioned the use of special
masters 5' in all Mount Laurel proceedings. 53 Special mas-
ters were to facilitate rewriting of the town ordinance."
Critics of Mount Laurel view the special masters as hand-pup-
pets of the supreme court. Not only is there a question of objec-
tivity,55 but there is also a conflict between the special mas-
ter and the elected official, for if the special master is assisting
in the rewriting of the zoning plan, then he or she is necessari-
ly infringing on the duty of the elected official. 5 '
2. Simple Remedy for a Complex Goal
Even the Mount Laurel courts will admit that exclusionary
zoning is a complex public policy issue.157 Aside from the
150. Id. Chief Justice Wilentz picked Steven Skillman, L. Anthony Gibson and Eu-
gene Serpentelli to serve as the Mount Laurel judges. Serpentelli had been a clerk
for the former Chief Justice Weintraub and had worked in a small firm that primari-
ly represented zoning and planning boards. During his interview with Chief Justice
Wilentz, he was asked whether he had "an automatic aversion to courts being in-
volved [in the deconstruction of barriers to exclusionary zoning]." Id. at 104.
Serpentelli was never asked about his feelings for the indigent or the need for afford-
able housing. Id.
151. Id.; see Rose, supra note 19, at 831 (implying that there was a direct rela-
tionship between the supreme court and the three Mount Laurel Judges).
152. See N.J. CT. R. 4:41-1 to -5 (1969).
153. Mount Laurel II, 456 A.2d 390, 453-55.
154. See KIRP ET AL., supra note 125, at 102.
155. See Rose, supra note 19, at 831-32. The "assumption that a court-appointed
special master will be more objective than the experts hired by the developer or the
municipality" is fallacious. Id.
156. Id. at 832. For discussion of the separation of powers argument, see supra
part III.A.
157. Justice Robert Clifford in a concurring opinion wrote:
While I am inclined to agree with much of his gentle probing of the
vulnerable areas, I tend to look upon whatever infirmity may inhere in
our position not as the result of flawed analysis but rather as an unfor-
tunate but inescapable by-product of the judicial function being called
upon to solve the extraordinarily complex problems underlying this litiga-
tion-problems whose solution, it may be plausibly argued, should be
undertaken elsewhere.
Oakwood at Madison, Inc. v. Township of Madison, 371 A.2d 1192, 1268 (N.J. Super.
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question of the court's legitimacy in usurping the duties of the
legislative and executive branches, the court as an institution is
incapable of solving a complex problem with one ruling."8 In
fashioning its remedy on a crafted constitutional right, the
Mount Laurel II court is guilty of tunnel vision. While vindicat-
ing the right to a fair opportunity to affordable housing, the
court had won the battle but lost the war.'59 The public policy
of zoning, the socio-economic and political forces that construct
both real and imaginary walls around us, was not and could
not be addressed by the rezoning remedy.6 '
The simplistic remedy was misleading to the public. "Re-
gion,"'1 61 fair share"6 2  and "least-cost housing"" formed a
catchy new vocabulary that failed to convey the serious implica-
tions behind them." If the court intended these words to es-
tablish benchmarks, its message got lost. Instead, the public,
seeing the court as a problem-solver, was "galvanized by the
initial formulaic result." 65 Neither the court nor the public
could foresee the consequences that this simple remedy would
have.
IV. SUBURBS'S RESPONSE
For Haar, the judiciary's initial involvement in Mount Laurel
was unavoidable. By the time Mount Laurel I had been initiat-
ed, the role of the courts in public law litigation had become
Ct. 1974) (Clifford, J., concurring), modified, 371 A.2d 1192 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1977).
158. See HOROWITZ, supra note 147, at 35-36.
159. Horowitz argues that courts often view remedies as subsidiary to the vindica-
tion of rights. Id. at 34.
160. See Rose, supra note 19.
161. See generally Mount Laurel II, 456 A.2d 390, 438-39.
162. Id. at 436. "Fair share" requires the calculation of several numbers, such as
future jobs and proportion of racial minorities. The court found itself in a Catch-22: if
it chose to correlate the allocation formula to a number of future jobs or proportion
of racial minorities, they would disregard "principles of sound planning." Instead, if
the calculation was too complicated, the judgment of the court would be attacked as
an intervention into the legislative process. Rose, supra note 35, at 870.
163. Mount Laurel II, 456 A.2d at 451-52. "Least-cost housing," which implies that
after the well-off move out of the cities and into the suburbs, the poor will be able to
take their places, exacerbates problems of inner cities, instead of ameliorating them.
See Rose, supra note 35, at 868 (discussing the effects of the trickle-down theory).
164. See Payne, supra note 32, at 27.
165. Id.
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extensive: "the constitutional responsibility to enforce public law
norms forced the judiciary to undertake an extensive and, at
times, coercive reordering of the way localities managed their
land-use regulations."16 More importantly, a lawsuit had been
filed, thus mandating the court's attention to this matter. Haar
writes, "[c]ourts by law must hear the claims of illegality put
forth by plaintiffs and the responses by defendants and then
make a determination."'67 As public servants, the court could
not avoid the case.
Having set forth the reasons for initial judicial involvement,
Suburbs portrays the specific actions taken by the Mount
Laurel courts as within their powers. Judicial involvement in
the executive and legislative branches, extant counter-
majoritarianism and creative use of special masters and court
procedures were within the "doctrinal experience""6 of, and
fair game to, the Mount Laurel court.
A. Necessity of Judicial Involvement
Haar suggests that both the legislative and executive branch-
es are partially responsible for exclusionary zoning, and hence,
the involvement of the judiciary in the work of the other two
branches.
Surely the failure of the legislative and executive branches
to ensure equal access to suburban land was not the
product of lack of awareness .... But whether owing to
short-run views of self-interest, institutional ineffectiveness,
or weakness of political will, the metropolitan areas re-
mained unacceptably fragmented and encapsulated from the
social and human points of view.'69
While the malfeasance or nonfeasance of the other branches
does not excuse the intrusion into the branches, it does
strengthen the case for judicial involvement. In fact, Haar sug-
166. SUBURBS, supra note 46 at 186.
167. Id. at 176.
168. Id. at 149.
169. Id. at 177-78.
1120
BOOK NOTE
gests that the involvement of the judiciary was the catalyst for
the other branches' interest.7 °
1. Necessary Intrusion into the Legislative Branch
State legislatures delegate the power to zone to municipali-
ties so that they may zone for the general welfare of the
state--"over and beyond the municipality's own boundaries."7
This was the thrust of the Mount Laurel Doctrine. Inaction by
the legislature after Mount Laurel I prompted the Mount Lau-
rel II court to set forth affirmative remedies that involved zon-
ing decisions, typically the domain of elected zoning officials.
The judges' "entering the fray"'72 was represented by their ex-
tensive involvement in the determination of regional need and
fair share. In AMG Realty Co. v. Township of Warren, 3 the
court's energy was subsumed by these two determinations, for
"until practical meaning was attached to the concept of fair
share, no construction of suburban affordable housing could
proceed."'74 Haar suggests, then, that although Mount Laurel
11 may have initially tread upon the legislature in coming up
with zoning principles, in further defining the principles, the
court was only pursuing its stated mandate.
To some extent, the New Jersey legislature responded to
Mount Laurel s offer to enter its policymaking skills into the
exclusionary zoning arena. In 1985, motivated by hopes of "re-
moval of the close supervision by the judiciary of local zon-
ing,"'75 the New Jersey state legislature passed the FHA.76
Legislative intent reveals, however, that most in the legislature
believed that instead of dismantling the judiciary, they were
preserving the Mount Laurel Doctrine. 77 The preamble to the
Act evidenced what others might call servility to the judiciary:
it codifies the Mount Laurel Doctrine.178  Regaining their
170. See id. at 178.
171. Id. at 38 (emphasis added).
172. Id. at 55.
173. 504 A.2d 692 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1984).
174. SUBURBS, supra note 46, at 56.
175. Id. at 93.
176. Fair Housing Act, N.J. STAT. ANN. § 52:27D-301 (West 1986); see infra part
I.B.
177. SUBURBS, supra note 46, at 93.
178. Id.
1996] 1121
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 30:1093
senses, the legislature returned to its original task, displacing
the courts, with increased zeal. The FHA gave several powers
to the COAH, including the power to decide if the "proposed
local ordinances and related measures would, if enacted, satisfy
the Mount Laurel obligation."79
The significance of the FHA to the separation of powers argu-
ment is twofold. First, it showed that the legislature, although
hesitantly, was willing to overlook the intrusions the Mount
Laurel courts had made in achieving its goal. According to
Haar, the FHA serves as the "ratification of the Mount Laurel
rulings."' Second, the FHA demonstrates that the legislature
was ready to participate in the battle started by the judiciary.
By passing legislation that affected zoning, the legislature had
pushed the judicial branch out of the legislative branch. Finally,
the legislature had overcome the impasse that prompted the
intrusion of the Mount Laurel courts.''
2. Intrusion into the Executive Branch
Justice Hall's opinion in Mount Laurel 11 left no doubt as to
the direction the Mount Laurel Doctrine was headed. With its
broad constitutional language and provision of affirmative du-
ties, it could be said that Mount Laurel I served as a call to
arms for the other two branches. As Haar writes, "having set
the state constitutional standard, Mount Laurel I could be read
as an open invitation to the body politic to take charge of the
issue through its legislative and executive processes."' The
[Tihe New Jersey Supreme Court, through its rulings in [Mount Laurel I
and II, has determined that every municipality in a growth area has a
constitutional obligation to provide through its land use regulations a
realistic opportunity for a fair share of its region's present and prospec-
tive needs for housing for low and moderate income families.
Fair Housing Act, N.J. STAT. ANN. § 52:27D-302 (West 1986). Further evidence of the
legislature's acceptance of the Mount Laurel Doctrine can be seen in N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 40A:12A-16(a)(9) (West 1993), which states that municipalities may "[p]rovide tech-
nical assistance and support to nonprofit organizations and private developers inter-
ested in constructing low and moderate income housing."
179. SUBURBS, supra note 46, at 94; see N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 52:27D-314(a), (b)
(West 1986).
180. SUBURBS, supra note 46, at 131.
181. See id. at 187.
182. See id. at 31.
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court was forced to act in light of the "mass of physical evi-
dence illustrating the inequity between the separate worlds of
inner city and outer suburb." "c
In the history of Mount Laurel, for one branch to claim that
the other has violated the separation of powers would be hypo-
critical. Suburbs explains "when courts undertake institutional
restructuring as a result of a constitutional violation, the
already muddled boundaries among judicial, executive, legisla-
tive, and administrative actions become even harder to
draw."' In creating the statewide trial court, Mount Laurel
II employed managerial and executive branch devices. The
COAH, an executive body,1" is able to hear and decide mo-
tions, "'86 both of which are judicial functions.'87 The FHA
usurped the power of the executive branch when it created the
Fanwood Amendment."a
If it still was unclear what the role the executive branch
should take in the Mount Laurel litigation, Mount Laurel II did
not mince words. The court incorporated New Jersey's State
Development Guide Plan into its computations, thus "placing
the onus of refining technological and numerical requirements
on the executive branch of government."'89 The state planners
had an unequivocal role in deciding whether or not "the fair
share obligation applied to them."90 Mount Laurel II was ex-
tending a "cooperative hand" 9' to the executive branch and at
the same time strengthening its mandate by aligning forces
with the state.
183. Id. at 8-9.
184. Id. at 134.
185. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 52:27D-305 (West 1986).
186. See id. §§ 52:27D-313 to -316.
187. SUBURBS, supra note 46, at 134.
188. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 52:27D-311.1 (West Supp. 1996). The Amendment pre-
vents the COAH from requiring a municipality from fulfilling "all or any portion of
its fair share housing obligation through permitting the development or redevelopment
of property" that would require the demolition of a residential structure in that mu-
nicipality. Id. According to Haar, this provision of the FHA prohibits the COAH from
"requiring localities to consider land parcels already improved with sound residential
structures as potential sites for Mount Laurel Housing." SUBURBS, supra note 46, at
103.
189. SUBURBS, supra note 46 at 38.
190. Id.
191. Id. at 39.
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B. The Court Acted Democratically
The Mount Laurel court's protection of minority interests
raised concerns whether it was acting capriciously and against
majority wishes. Haar rebuts the countermajoritarian argument
by suggesting that the surrounding political environment and
the media served to keep the court accountable. Sources of
judicial restraint, however, were found inside the judicial
branch. Haar posits that the "strongly hierarchical"'92 nature
of the New Jersey Supreme Court allowed the trial courts to es-
sentially skirt appellate review because they were responsible
for their own conduct.
1. Countermajoritarianism Is Necessary
That the Mount Laurel judiciary confronted the
countermajoritarian dilemma each time it decided a case is a
concession Haar readily makes: "Nor should it be overlooked
that Mount Laurel II was a most courageous act, as deliberate
a countermajoritarian measure as it was extraordinary."'93 In
fact, Haar suggests that it was the fear that the Mount Laurel
Doctrine might not withstand the majoritarian threat that
prompted the court's "ultimate, if somewhat hesitant, accep-
tance in Hills' of the FHA and COAH."'95
The justices on the New Jersey Supreme Court are appointed
and then subjected to periodic reappointment.'96 They do not
enjoy the "tenure, salary assurance, and insulation from politics
that federal judges enjoy."'97 Chief Justice Wilentz, author of
the Mount Laurel II opinion, narrowly escaped veto of his reap-
pointment by the senate.'98 To Haar, the reappointment pro-
cess was a visible constraint upon the judiciary. Protection of
minority interests in general, and statements such as, "the
192. Id. at 151.
193. Id. at 51.
194. Hills Development Co. v. Township of Bernards, 510 A.2d 621, 631 (1986).
195. SUBURBS, supra note 46, at 150.
196. See N.J. CONST. art. VI, § 6, para. 3 (1947).




State controls the use of the land, all of the land,"'99 consti-
tute evidence of the Mount Laurel courts' anti-majoritarian
intent.
In light of the blatant countermajoritarianism of the Mount
Laurel court, Haar implies that the threat of an elected judicia-
ry "limit[s] the independence of a judiciary that must on occa-
sion render antimajoritarian conclusions.""0 Recognizing that
courts have a unique role in "the special minority protection
that an independent judiciary must provide,"2"' Haar suggests
that "a recognized consortium of minority organizations" 2
should be given a special role in the judicial selection. The
Mount Laurel courts, "in a regime committed to constitu-
tionalism," must protect the interests of those with low and
moderate income from elected officials' promulgation of ex-
clusionary zoning ordinances.0 3 Haar states that "[tlhus far,
the court has remained afloat despite the chop of the political
majority."2 0 4
2. Judicial Review is Not Imperative
Several factors of the Mount Laurel litigation make judicial
review unnecessary. First, liability was not made an issue of
the litigation.2 5 This significantly decreased the need for ap-
peal, because most claims of error are filed in hopes of revers-
ing a finding of liability. Second, the "strongly hierarchical"
nature of the New Jersey Court system set in stone the "stan-
dard of conduct."20 6 Mount Laurel II became the "Bible."2 7
As a result, the trial courts "knew where their parameters
lay."20 8 Haar writes, "the need for the check on trial court dis-
199. Id. at 70.





205. Id. at 153, 176.
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cretion that appellate review would have provided" was
reduced. °9
Third, the judges retained internal control over excessive
discretion.21 ° The trial courts were burdened by an overwhelm-
ing struggle to "adhere to the traditional judicial role, sensitive
to accepted constraints on their authority-especially the duty
of impartiality-while grappling with novel and complex rem-
edies."21' Being appointed by the supreme court, the three tri-
al court judges were immediately scrutinized for any traces of
partiality. They were scrupulous in the decisions they made
because they were held to a higher standard than the regular
trial court judge whose decision did not undergo this prelimi-
nary, informal judicial review.
Haar suggests that Justice Hall's deliberate insulation of the
Mount Laurel Doctrine from federal judicial review was inge-
nious." In order to be successful, Justice Hall had to protect
the Mount Laurel Doctrine from analysis under the Equal Pro-
tection and Due Process Clauses."'3 Justice Hall created a
constitutional basis for applying strict scrutiny to what were in
effect economic classifications. 4 In addition, while Justice
Hall never equated the right to affordable housing with a "fun-
damental interest," he did state that the right was of basic
importance, 15 thus reading the "first paragraph of the first
article of the constitution as an equal protection clause.""'
While some have posited that Justice Hall's deliberate at-
tempt to avoid judicial review was akin to "judicial aggrandize-
209. Id. at 151.
210. Id. at 152.
211. Id. at 151.
212. Id. at 23.
213. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
214. See Mount Laurel 1, 336 A.2d 713, 725.
Land use regulation is encompassed within the state's police power...
It is elementary theory that all police power enactments, no matter at
what level of government, must conform to the basic state constitutional
requirements of substantive due process and equal protection of the
laws[,] ... the requirements of which may be more demanding than
those of the federal Constitution.
Id.
215. SUBURBS, supra note 46, at 23 (quoting Mount Laurel I, 336 A.2d at 727).
216. Id. at 135.
ment,"21  Haar points out that Justice Hall had no choice.
Given the emerging trend in federal courts to discount equal
protection arguments in favor of local legislation, 18 Justice
Hall's use of state constitutional rights was warranted. Accord-
ing to Haar, "the federal judicial interpretation of the applica-
bility of equal protection clauses to land-use controls had been
far more deferential to local decision making than he was about
to be in his pathbreaking opinion."2
C. The Court Effectively Combatted Flaws of Adjudicatory
Process
Admittedly, the Mount Laurel courts were bound by the adju-
dicatory process and all of the flaws of that process, such as
the generalized knowledge and limited resources of the judges,
and the nature of the adjudicatory process. Specifically, one
major barrier the Mount Laurel courts faced was an inability to
grasp the intricacies of zoning. In addition, the courts needed to
implement their remedies without holding the hand of the par-
ties involved; herein lies the need for the special master. These
court-appointed experts served two roles. First, they were ex-
perts in zoning law and could assist judges in navigating the
tricky waters of zoning. Second, they proved essential in the
implementation of the zoning by providing the judges with
continuous progress reports of the implementation of the Mount
Laurel Doctrine's remedial zoning plans.
The nature of the adjudicatory process was another impedi-
ment to the Mount Laurel courts. Typically, the judicial process
is limited to formulating a verdict of guilt or innocence in the
criminal setting, or a judgment of some extent of liability in the
civil setting. At issue in the Mount Laurel cases, however, was
217. Rose, supra note 19, at 835.
218. See, e.g., Village of Arlington Heights, v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429
U.S. 252 (1977) (holding that a denial of a rezoning ordinance did not offend the
Equal Protection Clause even though African Americans comprised 40% of the income
eligible groups to live in the proposed housing project); San Antonio Ind. School Dist.
v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973) (rejecting classification of wealth as a suspect class
and deferring to the state's "reliance on local property taxation"). But c.f. City of
Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432 (1985) (striking down under the
rational basis test a zoning ordinance that prohibited use of a group home).
219. SUBURBS, supra note 46, at 19.
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correcting a wrong, not determining liability. ° Haar suggests
that despite the fact that the complex social issues involved in
righting the wrong committed by the municipalities were not
conducive to the simple result process of the judiciary, the
Mount Laurel courts reached a proportionate remedy in the
Mount Laurel Doctrine.
1. The Use of Special Masters22
As a special master in both the Boston Harbor222 and public
school funding litigation"' perhaps Haar's bias towards spe-
cial masters is predictable. Set in the context of the Mount
Laurel litigation, however, it is undeniable that they were in-
dispensable to the whole process. Special masters were court-
appointed experts in the field of planning and were able to
supply guidance on "arcane matters beyond the usual legal
ken."2" In addition, they served as "political consensus
builders"2" and brought a "professional astuteness ... [in]
determining whether a proposed project and site were suitable
from planning and environmental perspectives and.., whether
a builder's remedy should result."22 Being trained in the "ac-
cepted scientific and professional principles of regional land-use
planning,"227 special masters ensured that the limited knowl-
edge of the judges did not hinder the litigation process.
Special masters were on call to answer questions, sit on plan-
ning boards, and converse with engineers and concerned citi-
zens.2"s Anticipating the problems inherent in having a court-
appointed expert involved in negotiating, amending and testify-
ing on the compliance of a land-use regulation with the Mount
220. See id at 176.
221. FED. R. Civ. P. 53; N.J. CT. R. 4:41-1 to -5 (1969) (setting forth procedures
for using special masters).
222. See SUBURBS, supra note 46, at xiii, 172; Quincy v. Metropolitan Dist. Coun-
cil, No. 138,477 (Mass. Super. Ct. Dec. 17, 1982) (Boston Harbor litigation).
223. See Board of Educ. v. Boston, 434 N.E.2d 1224 (Mass. 1982); School Comm. of
Boston v. Boston, 421 N.E.2d 1187 (Mass. Sup. Ct. 1981) (school fumding litigation).
224. SUBURBS, supra note 46, at 73.
225. Id.
226. Id. at 74.
227. Id. at 73.
228. See id. at 76.
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Laurel Doctrine, the court encouraged parties to cross-examine
the special master during the stage of compliance review. Haar
contends that the court "always retained the fundamental re-
sponsibility (and power) for ensuring that constitutionally re-
quired standards were observed."229
Still, questions remained among the Mount Laurel litigants
about the neutrality of the special masters. First, there was the
fear that a special master, because of her almost daily contact
with a judge, would become partial to the judge. Again, the
court responded to possible impropriety by rotating the masters
and putting them "under clear instructions that they should
never offer an opinion or make a comment that would convey
the impression that it was attributable to a judge."230 Thus,
the special masters were able to remain independent from the
judge.
Second, there was a concern that the special masters would
be like "hired gun" lawyers, more than willing to provide the
client with the service needed and incapable of being an impar-
tial participant."' Once one offered her services as a special
master, she could be hired by either side of the litigation.
232
According to Haar, the selection of the special master greatly
contributed to solving this problem of neutrality. Haar elaborat-
ed, "Whatever the background, whether generalist or specialist,
a master above all had to be a finely tuned political ani-
mal." 3 Suburbs indicates that contrary to the critics of the
special masters, the leanings of the professional planners did
not play a role in the Mount Laurel litigation.
2. Response of Judiciary is Proportionate to Problem
The Mount Laurel courts' creation and implementation of a
complex remedial scheme runs counter to the American ideal of
the adjudicatory process. Most consider courts as the arena in
which two parties with adverse interests enter and after the
229. Id. at 75.
230. Id. at 76.
231. See id. at 78.
232. See id.
233. Id. at 82.
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final arbiter-the judge-issues a command, one party exits the
victor. The Mount Laurel cases, however, forced the courts to
"shape a workable remedy."2"
Due to several factors, the Mount Laurel courts were able to
bypass the "classic trial procedure- [of] . . . assigning
liability" 5 and focus on the "task of correcting a continuous
pattern of wrongdoing by government."236 For example, in
most cases liability was conceded. In those cases where liability
was an issue, political forces had compelled municipal attorneys
to assert the municipality's compliance with the Mount Laurel
Doctrine.23
In addition, the Mount Laurel courts took advantage of the
statutorily granted use of special masters.23 The special mas-
ters assisted the courts in two ways. First, by answering "high-
ly technical questions to do with science or the complex interac-
tions between economic and political policies--questions that
form the core of many institutional decrees" they helped the
judges "sift[ ] through alternative plans on the basis of
practicality.""9 Second, through ex-parte proceedings, they
were able to negotiate with parties that were to be affected by
the zoning while maintaining the confidences of others. In this
way, the courts were able to form a complex, multi-faceted
remedy.
Haar suggests that while the ramifications of exclusionary
zoning are complex,24 the problem itself, as phrased by Jus-
tice Hall, was simple.241 The court's remedy was to burden the
municipalities with including provisions for low- and moderate-
income housing.242 Concededly, the mechanisms they used to
implement the remedy were intricate, but they were necessary




238. See N.J. CT. R. 4:41-1 to -5 (1969).
239. SUBURBS, supra note 46, at 137.
240. See id. at 6.
241. See id at 19.
242. See id. at 20.
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for the solution." Haar demonstrates that Mount Laurel
could battle a complex problem with a simple solution.
V. CONCLUSION
Many things are still unknown about the environmental,'
economic2  and social" implications of Mount Laurel. Some
state that the policies advocated by Mount Laurel have resulted
in the continued economic decline of the inner cities.247 Others
do not think that Mount Laurel will travel well. Early indica-
tions are that courts are hesitant to "enter the fray" as the
Mount Laurel judges did.2"
What is certain is that by its judicial mandate in Mount
Laurel, the New Jersey Supreme Court has changed forever the
role of courts in land-use planning. Ironically, in some ways
Mount Laurel represented the judiciary's chickens coming home
to roost. For years, the unspoken policy of the New Jersey
judiciary was to be very deferential to the local planning
boards.24 Acquiescence on both a national and state level to
appointed official's zoning for the general welfare bred
abuse."0 Now it was up to the New Jersey Supreme Court to
undo years of dangerous precedent.
243. See id. at 51.
244. See Blomquist, supra note 39, at 598-611 (discussing the impact of Mount
Laurel on solar energy development in New Jersey).
245. See Jerome G. Rose, From the Legislatures, 18 R-AL EST. L.J. 371 (1990)
(analyzing New Jersey's Transportation Development Act, which allows a county to
apply for an exemption from development fees for any development of low- and mod-
erate-income housing units that are built pursuant to the Fair Housing Act of under
court settlement).
246. See Harold A. McDougall, From Litigation to Legislation in Exclusionary Zon-
ing Law, 22 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 623, 625 (1987) (stating that "the lesson of New
Jersey is that the legislature will not act without pressure from the judiciary").
247. See Rose, supra note 19, at 817. Rose argues that lower-income tenants would
give a lower total gross rent roll for the owner, which in turn would result in a
lower capitalized value of property. The lower market value of the real estate would
cause a lower tax assessment of the property and this would result in a reduced tax
revenue for the city. See id.
248. Payne, supra note 19, at 84. In an article comparing Holmdel with its con-
temporaries in New York, Payne says that Holmdel would work better in New York
because "[it] carries none of the baggage that comes with the Mount Laurel doc-
trine . . . it does not require judges to become land use policymakers .. Id.
249. See SUBURBS, supra note 46, at 132.
250. See id at 8.
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To the forward-thinking Mount Laurel judiciary, intervention
was the only way to effect change. Prompted by the inaction of
the governor and the legislature, it issued affirmative obliga-
tions on all Mount Laurel-type municipalities.25' The obliga-
tions appeared simple, but in fact would require the implemen-
tation of a complex administrative mechanism, at the heart of
which was the special master, and eventually would provoke
the legislative and executive branches to join forces with the
judiciary. Although to many, the steps taken by the judiciary
appeared unprecedented, Suburbs makes the point that "[nione
of the trial judges saw himself as writing on a procedurally
blank slate."252 Use of a special master had always been avail-
able to the courts, but had never been employed with such
efficacy. The Mount Laurel courts were determined to use every
arrow in their quiver to attain the desired goals.
Notwithstanding the "prescient"25' opinions of Justice
Hall,M some were not prepared for the New Jersey Supreme
Court to react as strongly as it did in Mount Laurel II. Proxim-
ity to the harms of exclusionary zoning has proven to be a
factor in one's acceptance of the New Jersey judiciary's activ-
ism. On the one hand, the justices were plied with statistics
revealing employment rates and projected housing for Camden
and the suburbs. On the other, those that did not have these
numbers saw only a snapshot of the dangerous trend of spatial
segregation. Municipalities used exclusionary laws to zone for
the welfare of the suburbs, not for the region. For many of
these municipalities, the ability to exclude a type of person,
black or poor or both, was a right deeply entrenched by years
of silent approval. It seems that the status quo has a dulling
effect on one's appetite for change.
251. See id. at 187.
252. Id. at 152.
253. Id. at 17.
254. See, e.g., AMG Assocs. v. Township of Springfield, 319 A.2d 705 (N.J. 1974)
(holding that one cannot zone into idleness); Rutgers v. Piluso, 286 A.2d 697 (N.J.
1972) (holding that a right of eminent domain is not determinative of a grant of im-
munity); DeSimone v. Englewood, 267 A.2d 31 (N.J. 1970) (upholding use variance for
low- and moderate-income housing); Vickers v. Township Comm. of Gloucester Town-
ship, 181 A.2d 129, 252 (N.J. 1962) (dissenting from decision that held ordinance
prohibiting mobile homes was constitutional).
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Was the Mount Laurel Doctrine effective? Suburbs makes the
answer unequivocally clear. First, there is the hard evidence:
between 1987 and 1993, 11,000 parcels a year were "overseen
or influenced" by the courts or COAH; New Jersey municipali-
ties had rehabilitated, zoned, or built 54,000 dwelling units;
14,000 new units of affordable housing were built (nine percent
of the total number of housing units built in New Jersey) and
11,000 units rehabilitated.2 5 Suburbs cautions, however, that
"thus far, integration on a physical scale of African-Americans
and Latinos from inner-city neighborhoods has fallen short of
expectations."256
The numbers indicate the physical manifestation of the
Mount Laurel Doctrine's effectiveness. Equally important, how-
ever, is the change in the public's views about the role of the
court in correcting social injustices. Ethel Lawrence serves as a
testament for the belief that one's undeterred faith in the ju-
dicial system will not go unrewarded. For the skeptics, Haar
poses this query at the end of Suburbs: "Will history conclude
that without the intervention of the courts the metropolitan
United States would have gone the way of other societies
buried under their own contradictions and destroyed by an
inability to correct imbalances too glaring and injustices too
painful."2 7
As with many legal decisions, a scale should be applied to
weigh the consequences of judicial intervention in Mount Lau-
rel: On one side are the incredible statistics indicating a severe
need for housing in the suburbs in order to accommodate the
jobs in Camden, the inaction of the legislative and executive
branches, and the converted chicken coops that many African-
American residents of Mount Laurel were forced to live in. On
the other side are the traditions of the separation of powers
and judicial restraint. Faced with the dire consequences that
would result from inaction, the Mount Laurel judiciary chose to
enter the fray.258
255. See SUBURBS, supra note 46, at 189-90.
256. Id. at 191.
257. Id. at 208.
258. Ironically, it is one of the Mount Laurel Doctrine's critics who also suggests
that the rationalizing of the Mount Laurel Doctrine depends on whether it meets the
conditions of the "Holocaust imperative." Rose, supra note 35, at 888. The Holocaust
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The contribution of Suburbs to the land-use discourse is mul-
ti-faceted. Foremost, Suburbs should be read as a tribute to the
achievements of the Mount Laurel judiciary in effecting a posi-
tive change in the area of exclusionary zoning. In addition,
Haar demonstrates that the success of the activist judiciary
should not be limited to land-use cases. Whenever there is
stagnancy among the executive and legislative branches, and
the judiciary is asked to resolve an issue, as Ethel Lawrence
asked the New Jersey courts, the intrusion of the judiciary is
both appropriate and necessary. Finally, balancing the
strengths of an activist judiciary with an examination of its
flaws, Haar provides a realistic look at the inability of the
judiciary to "descend from the mountain"259 to gain public sup-
port for its lofty principles. Haar appears genuinely concerned
with the ability of the courts to get their messages to the pub-
lic, for it will be the one to live with the decisions.
Finally, for the careful student of land-use, the activism of
the New Jersey judiciary should not come as a surprise. Justice
Sutherland proved extremely prophetic in Euclid6 ° when he
suggested the "possibility of cases where the general public
interest would so far outweigh the interest of the municipality
that the municipality would not be allowed to stand in the
way."2"' It is not surprising that Justice Hall used this lan-
guage in Mount Laurel I.262 Like Euclid, Mount Laurel has
and will continue to set precedents in the area of land-use law.
However, as Suburbs demonstrates, the success of the New Jer-
sey courts in remedying the harm done by exclusionary zoning
should remain unparalleled as an example of the invaluable
role of the activist judiciary.
imperative implies that if the "evils of exclusionary zoning are sufficiently onerous,
and the remedies sufficiently workable," then the Mount Laurel Doctrine was justi-
fied. Id.
259. SUBURBS, supra note 46, at 172.
260. Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
261. Id. at 390.
262. 336 A.2d 713, 726.
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